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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, we construct a DSGE
model which spells out explicitly the instrumentation of monetary policy.
The interest rate is determined every period depending on the supply and
demand for reserves which in turn are aﬀected by fundamental shocks: un-
foreseeable changes in cash withdrawal, autonomous factors, technology
and government spending. Unexpected changes in the monetary condi-
tions of the economy are interpreted as monetary shocks. We show that
these monetary shocks have the usual eﬀects on economic activity without
the need of imposing additional frictions as limited participation in asset
markets or sticky prices.
Second, we show that this view of monetary policy may have important
consequences for empirical research. In the model, the contemporaneous
correlations between interest rates, prices and output are due to the simul-
taneous eﬀect of all fundamental shocks. We provide an example where
these contemporaneous correlations may be misinterpreted as a Taylor
rule. In addition, we use the sign of the impact responses of all shocks on
output, prices and interest rates derived from the model to identify the
sources of shocks in the data.
1 Introduction
The monetary transmission mechanism has been a predominant topic in mod-
ern Macroeconomics. In practice, this research agenda has proceeded as follows.
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The main aim of the theoretical literature has been to construct models that
reproduce, at least qualitatively, the way the economy is believed to respond to
monetary shocks. Most of these models share the same design. For money to
have real eﬀects on economic activity some sort of rigidity is assumed, either in
the agents’ ability to adjust their portfolio of assets or in the determination of
some nominal price. In these models, monetary policy is described as a lump-
sum transfer of money or as variations in Taylor rules,1 i.e. a policy rule that
specifies the interest rate as a function of the state of the economy, typically
described by inflation and an output gap measure. Monetary policy shocks are
then unexpected transfers of money or random terms in the Taylor rule, re-
spectively. Because these models do not make any distinction between diﬀerent
monetary aggregates or between diﬀerent asset maturities, they presume that
the central bank has perfect control either of a broad measure of money or of a
long-term interest rate.
On the other hand, a recurrent theme in the empirical literature has been
the identification of monetary policy shocks through VAR techniques. The main
strategy in many of these papers has been the decomposition of the variance
matrix of disturbances estimated from a VAR on output, prices, a short term
interest rate and other policy variables like the level of reserves. A common
practice is to use a lower triangular decomposition with the short term rate
ordered after output and prices. This way, the interest rate equation has the
form of a Taylor rule and its disturbance is identified as the monetary policy
shock. Another route has been taken by proponents of factor analysis. The
purpose of this scheme is to describe the covariance structure among variables
in terms of a few unobservable common factors.
We believe the connections between the theoretical strand of this literature
and its empirical counterpart are very loose. This is for several reasons:
1. As noted above, theoretical models work under the assumption of central
banks directly controlling a long term interest rate or a broadly defined
monetary aggregate. However, this is far from true in reality. Mone-
tary policy is conducted using instruments designed to aﬀect ‘operating
targets’, namely, short-term interest rates and narrowly defined money.
In particular, nowadays most central banks usually lend out liquidity via
open market operations and define their operating target in terms of the
overnight interbank interest rate.
2. Although most of the theoretical work concentrates on the responses of
output and inflation on changes in long-term rates and broad definitions of
money, the empirical papers look at those responses stemming from unex-
pected changes in short term rates and reserves. Still, no attempt has been
done at the theoretical level to seriously analyze the connection between
the two sets of variables and their role in the propagation mechanism.
3. Taylor rules still are the central construct in both empirical and theoretical
work. In this kind of setup, this literature has not yet provided a sensi-
1See Taylor [7].
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ble explanation about what monetary policy shocks mean. The typical
explanations run from changes in preferences of central bankers to mea-
surement errors in the data collected by the monetary authority. In any
case, the literature has not shown how such explanations can generate the
types of shocks we measure, at least theoretically. Besides, it is not clear
why central banks keep being a source of uncertainty in our economies, a
source of uncertainty regarded as important by many economists.
4. From a theoretical perspective, the exclusion restrictions imposed by em-
pirical researchers are far from being justified. Instead, theoretical models
usually predict all fundamental shocks aﬀecting all endogenous variables
contemporaneously. This critique, already made by Canova and Pina [2],
is important in the sense that the Cholesky decomposition is just one out of
infinitely many possible decompositions of the VAR disturbances. Further-
more, once the monetary shocks are computed with triangular schemes,
the other “fundamental shocks” that these strategies deliver have no clear
interpretation as the shocks that we usually deal with in our theoretical
models, namely, technology, fiscal, preferences, and the like.
5. Finally, the main drawback of factor analysis is that the factors obtained
with this scheme usually have no economic content.
The aim of this paper is to fill some of these gaps. For that, we first construct
a DSGE model which spells out explicitly the procedure by which monetary
policy is done in actual economies. To get a feeling about the issues involved
consider the way monetary policy is conducted in the model. At the begin-
ning of each period the central bank sets the level of reserves via open market
operations. The interest rate is determined later in the period depending on
the supply and demand for reserves. The supply of reserves may be aﬀected
randomly by changes in cash withdrawals by the public and/or transfers of re-
serves by the Treasury not compensated by the central bank. The demand for
reserves may be shifted by variations in the demand for deposits by the clients
of the bank due to technology and demand shocks aﬀecting economic activity.
Hence, the model specifies how the interest rate deviates from its expected value.
We show how these deviations are a function of all fundamental shocks in the
economy.
This model has several advantages over other macro models. First, this econ-
omy presents a monetary non-neutrality without the need of imposing further
frictions than the ones required to have money valued in general equilibrium.
Thus, we do not rely on sticky prices or a limited participation of agents in asset
markets.2 The demand for reserves due to reserve requirements and settlement
accounts for payment systems combined with the need of firms to finance their
factor remunerations before they get the receipts from selling their product is
2Coleman, Gilles and Labadie [5] build a similar model of the reserve market. However,
they impose a limited participacion structure and specify monetary policy as a conventional
feedback rule for the interest rate.
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suﬃcient to let monetary policy aﬀect economic activity.3
Second, the model includes several fundamental shocks. We use the re-
sponses of our variables of interest to these shocks in the identification strategy
at the end of the paper. The aim of this process is to construct series for shocks
interpretable from a theoretical perspective. Furthermore, we show how several
shocks can be interpreted as “monetary policy shocks” in the sense of generating
the responses usually associated with these type of disturbances. An econome-
trician using data generated by the model would not be able to distinguish
between shocks originated at the central bank when supplying reserves through
open market operations from other fundamental shocks, such as changes in the
cash to deposit ratio, not compensated by the central bank.
All our fundamental shocks aﬀect all endogenous variables contemporane-
ously. So, we follow the sign restriction approach developed by Canova and de
Nicoló [1] in the identification of shocks. For us, the contemporaneous nature of
the relation between endogenous variables is of crucial importance for the way
we interpret and identify monetary shocks. We provide an example to illustrate
this point. In particular, we show that correlations between the interest rate,
output and prices can arise such that they might be misinterpreted as a Taylor
rule with a random term which is usually labelled a “monetary policy shock”.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the model. In
section 3 we illustrate how the model works and solve for the policy functions.
In section 4 we present a simple example with the implications of the model
for the identification of shocks. In section 5 we apply the identification scheme
derived from the model to the data. A discussion in chapter 6 concludes by
highlighting the potential of the model as a laboratory for future research.
2 The Model
2.1 The Setup
In this model economy there are four diﬀerent types of agents: a continuum
of households in the unit interval, competitive firms, competitive banks, and a
government. All households are identical and composed of a consumer and a
worker. Each household ranks stochastic streams of consumption (ct) and labor
supply (nt) according to the utility function
E0
" ∞X
t=0
βtU (ct, nt)
#
(1)
with
U (ct, nt) =
c1−γt
1− γ −Ψ
n1+ψt
1 + ψ
. (2)
3The same is true in the flexible price version of the model of Heer and Schabert [6] who
built another general equilibrium model with open-market operations.
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Households begin each period with financial wealth Aht . The timing of events
is as follows. Shocks are realized at the beginning of the period. After shocks
are known, an asset market opens where the consumer divides the household’s
wealth Aht depositing an amount St to an illiquid savings account and leaving
the remaining as liquid assets, Zt,
Aht ≥ St + Zt. (3)
Then a goods market opens where the consumer decides how much to consume
ct. The nominal price of consumption goods is Pt. At the same time, a labor
market opens and the worker decides how many units of labor to supply nt.
The consumer’s purchases of goods are subject to the finance constraint
Ptct ≤ Zt +Wtnt − Ptτ t ≡Mt, (4)
whereWtnt is his wage income, which the firm where the worker works transfers
at the beginning of the period, and Ptτ t is a lump-sum tax deducted by the
government. In the goods market, liquid assets Mt are split between cash, Xt,
and checkable deposits, Dt. To simplify matters, we assume that the currency-
to-deposit ratio is determined exogenously by the random variable ηt, that is,
Mt = Dt +Xt, (5)
with
Xt = ηtDt. (6)
Using (4) and (5), (6) yields
Dt =
Zt +Wtnt − Ptτ t
1 + ηt
, Xt = ηt
Zt +Wtnt − Ptτ t
1 + ηt
. (7)
Thus, the household pays the fraction 1/(1+ ηt) of total consumption spending
Ptct with its deposits and the fraction ηt/(1 + ηt) with cash.
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The household receives all its non-labor income at the end of the period. It
earns interest at rate ist on the amount St in its savings account. The funds
in the deposit account earn no interest. Finally, as the owner of one of the
representative banks and firms it collects the profits ΠFt + Π
B
t . Hence, the
financial wealth of the household evolves as:
Aht+1 = Dt +Xt − Ptct + (1 + ist )St +ΠFt +ΠBt . (8)
The problem of the household is to choose sequences for consumption, ct, labor
supply, nt, liquid assets, Zt, and savings, St, to maximize its utility (1) given
prices and subject to constraints (3), (4), (7) and (8).
Firms produce using labor (ndt ) through the production function
yt = f(qt, gt, n
d
t ) = qtg
αg
t (n
d
t )
1−α, (9)
4Of course, given the rate of return dominance of other assets, liquid assets are only held
for transaction purposes and depleted totally within the period.
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where qt is a technology shock and gt is productive government expenditures
which firms take as given.5 Producers start each period with no financial funds.
Since they have to pay their wage bill in advance, producers ask for a loan, Lt,
from a bank at the interest rate ilt. Loans are assumed to be default free. These
wages are transferred to the checking account of workers at the beginning of the
period. The problem of the firm is then to choose labor, ndt , to maximize profits
ΠFt = Ptf(qt, gt, n
d
t )− (1 + ilt)Wtndt
given prices.
Banks are in the business of providing deposits to households and inter-
mediating liquid assets between consumers and producers. They also hold the
financial assets of the economy from one period to the other. The liability side of
their balance sheets is comprised of savings deposits, St, and checkable deposits
of households, Dt. Banks hold assets in the form of reserves, Rt, government
bonds, Bt, and loans to firms, Lt. Thus,
Bt + Lt +Rt = St +Dt. (10)
The return on government bonds is ibt . Reserves earn no interest. Banks demand
them because they are subject to a reserve requirement by which they have to
hold a fraction ρ of checking deposits as reserves,
Rt ≥ ρ×Dt. (11)
Profits are given by:
ΠBt = i
b
tBt + i
l
tLt − istSt. (12)
The problem of the bank is to determine the composition of assets and liabilities
to maximize profits given prices.
The Government is divided into two departments: the fiscal authority
manages government consumption and public debt while the monetary author-
ity decides about the split of public debt into liquid and illiquid liabilities.
Government consumption gt is assumed to be exogenous and stochastic. Public
expenditure is composed of government consumption plus interest payments on
government bonds (ibt−1Bt−1) and it is financed by means of the lump-sum tax
τ t on households so
Ptgt + i
b
t−1Bt−1 = Ptτ t.
The monetary authority is able to aﬀect the interest rate of the economy by
deciding on the composition of government liabilities, At, into illiquid bonds,
Bt, and liquid high-powered money, i.e. the monetary base, Ht. This monetary
base is used either as reserves (including vault cash), Rt, as cash in the hands of
5Here, we assume capital to be fixed at 1. Profits of firms, which represent capital’s
remuneration, are transferred to households at the end of the period.
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the public, Xt, or changed by autonomous factors (float or Treasury deposits),
Vt. Remember that Xt = ηt(Zt +Wtnt − Ptτ t)/(1 + ηt). Hence, we have
Rt + ηt
µ
Zt +Wtnt − Ptτ t
1 + ηt
¶
+ Vt = Ht, (13)
or
Rt = Ht − Vt − ηt
µ
Zt +Wtnt − Ptτ t
1 + ηt
¶
. (14)
This is one of the central equations of the model. It says that the amount
of reserves in the hands of the banks to satisfy reserve requirements, Rt, can
change for four distinct reasons. First, the central bank can aﬀect it through
open market operations that change the initial monetary base, Ht, in order to
induce changes in the interest rate. Second, it is aﬀected by shocks to reserves
which may come from the Treasury and float, Vt. Third, a higher demand for
cash due to a change in the cash/deposit ratio ηt also induces movements in the
total amount of reserves. Finally, all shocks aﬀecting Zt,Wt, Pt and nt modify
the amount of cash that is withdrawn and hence the level of reserves.
Expression (14) is important for several reasons. First, it summarizes the
problem of the central bank. Assume the central bank has a desired level for the
interest rate. The actual level of the interest rate determined in the market on
period t is going to be related to Rt. Thus, the problem of the central bank is to
determine the size of the open market operation, i.e. how much to change Ht,
to compensate for the rest of shocks in the economy providing enough monetary
base to cover demand for reserves and cash at the desired interest rate. Second,
this expression is also important because it summarizes all sources of monetary
shocks in the model which aﬀect the interest rate. In this sense, in a world
where the central bank wants the target rate to be fixed at a particular value,
but has imperfect knowledge about the diﬀerent shocks hitting the economy or
does not fully compensate the shocks it has information about, we will observe
the interest rate to be moving in response to shocks not compensated by the
central bank. Below we will make explicit the information set of the central
bank and the rule it follows in terms of the instruments under its control. Then
we construct a monetary shock accordingly.
Finally, assume total government liabilities, Bt+Ht, are constant so that the
role of monetary policy is to change its composition between liquid and illiquid
liabilities. Then, the evolution of total government liabilities in private hands,
At, is described by:
At+1 = At − (Vt+1 − Vt). (15)
Note that in equilibrium the financial wealth Aht of the households corresponds
to these liabilities of the government which are the only financial assets that
survive from one period to the next. Hence, the growth rate of government
liabilities used in period t by the system is
µt+1 =
At+1
At
=
1 + vt
1 + vt+1
(16)
where lower case letters refer to nominal variables normalized by At.
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2.2 Derivation of Equilibrium Conditions
Let ξ = (q, g, η, v) be the vector of shocks. Dividing by At, the stationary
problem of the household/firm may be rewritten as
J(a, ξ, h) = max
c,n,z,s,nd
©
U (c, n) + βE
£
J(a0, ξ0, h0)
¤ª
, (17)
subject to
pc ≤ z + wn− pτ, (18)
z + s ≤ a, (19)
µ0a0 = z + wn− pτ − pc+ (1 + is) s+ pf(q, g, nd)− (1 + il)wnd + πb, (20)
with
µ0 =
1 + v
1 + v0
, (21)
and lower case letters refer to nominal variables normalized by A with
a =
Ah
A
. (22)
Also, banks maximize their profits
max πbt = i
b
tbt + i
l
tlt − istst, (23)
subject to
bt + lt + rt = dt + st, (24)
and
rt = ρ× dt, (25)
which is equivalent to
bt + lt − st = (1− ρ) dt. (26)
Perfect competition in the banking industry implies that interest rates equalize:
ibt = i
l
t = i
s
t = it. (27)
Using the functional forms in (2) and (9), and after imposing market clear-
ing in the labor market, the equations determining equilibrium are the
optimum decisions by households and firms,
1
ptc
γ
t
= β(1 + it)Et
∙µ
1 + vt+1
1 + vt
¶
1
pt+1c
γ
t+1
¸
, (28)
(1− α)qtgαgt = (1 + it)Ψn
α+ψ
t c
γ
t , (29)
yt = qtg
αg
t n
1−α
t , (30)
market clearing in the goods market,
ct + gt = yt, (31)
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and market clearing in the reserve market,
ht = vt +
µ
ρ+ ηt
1 + ηt
¶
ptct. (32)
These are five equations to determine {yt, ct, nt, pt, it} as functions of the
policy instrument, ht, and the fundamental shocks qt, gt, ηt, and vt.
In what follows we will assume the shocks to be i.i.d. and specified as:
1. technology,
qt = qss exp(bqt); bqt+1 = εqt+1, (33)
2. government expenditures
gt = gss exp(bgt); bgt+1 = εgt+1, (34)
3. cash demand or cash to deposit ratio,
ηt = ηss exp(bηt); bηt+1 = εηt+1, (35)
4. autonomous factors
vt = vss exp(bvt); bvt+1 = εvt+1, (36)
with εkt ∼ N(0, σ2k), k = q, g, η, v. Variables with the subindex ss denote steady
state values. Notice hatted variables have the interpretation of percentage de-
viations with respect to steady states.
2.3 Solution of the Model and Calibration
Log-linearizing equations (28) to (32) around the steady state and substituting
for nt and ct, leads to a system of equations in our variables of interest, namely
output, prices and the interest rate. The solution of this system expressed as
deviations with respect to the steady state can be written in the following form:6
byt = θyqbqt + θygbgt + θyηbηt + θyvbvt + θyhbht, (37)
bpt = θpqbqt + θpgbgt + θpηbηt + θpvbvt + θphbht, (38)bit = θiqbqt + θigbgt + θiηbηt + θivbvt + θihbht. (39)
There are 18 parameters in the model. These are the parameters for pref-
erences (β, γ, Ψ, ψ), technology (α, αg), reserve requirements (ρ), shocks (qss,
gss, ηss, vss, σq, σg, ση, σv) and the ones associated with the rule determining
the monetary policy instrument (ht) to be specified below. For the calibration
described in Appendix B, the coeﬃcients of the system (37) to (39) are:
6See the Appendix for the details of the log-linearization and for the definition of the θ
coeﬃcients.
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Table 1
Impact coeﬃcients (model)
Shocksbqt bgt bηt bvt bhtbyt 0.9359 0.2044 -0.1388 -0.0016 0.2175bpt -1.2132 0.0312 -0.4620 -0.0040 0.7241bit -2.9531 0.0761 1.0892 0.0131 -1.7069
So, an increase in the technology shock (q) raises output at the same time that it
reduces prices and the interest rate. Furthermore, a fiscal shock (g) rises output,
prices and the interest rate. The cash demand shock (η) decreases prices and
output and increases the interest rate as the autonomous factor shock (v) does
while the oﬃcial reserves (h) behave in the opposite direction. A decrease in η
is expansionary because it increases the liquid liabilities of commercial banks in
relation to their illiquid ones and, therefore, it has the same qualitative eﬀects
of a decrease in v or an increase in h. Unlike h and v which change the total
liquid liabilities of the system, movements in η only change the composition of
the monetary base between reserves and cash. In any case, these three shocks
aﬀect the composition of government liabilities which is what determines the
interest rate.
Several points are in order here. First, changes in the monetary conditions
of the economy (as measured by η, v or h) have real eﬀects without imposing
additional frictions like limited participation in the asset market or sticky prices.
This result is due to the combination of the CIA constraint together with the
fact that the monetary authority controls the composition of the government li-
abilities which aﬀect the nominal interest rate through the reserve requirement.
Second, shocks η, v together with changes in the monetary policy instrument h
imply the same eﬀects we usually attribute to monetary shocks. An econome-
trician, with data on the endogenous variables y, p, and i will not be able to
identify these three sources of innovations.
In the next section we will make explicit the rule the central bank uses to de-
termine the instrument ht as well as the information the central bank may have
when making this policy decision. Then, we will apply diﬀerent identification
schemes to see which identification method is able to recover the fundamental
shocks of the economy.
2.4 Specification of monetary policy
Assume the central bank determines bht at the beginning of the period using a
feedback rule to set a target for the interest rate equal to
iTRt = iss + δyE
CB
t (byt) + δpECBt (bpt)− εTRt , (40)
where δy, δp ≥ 0. In this expression ECBt represents the expectation operator
with the information set of the central bank at the moment of the policy decision
on bhCBt and εTRt is a monetary policy shock to the target rate. Thus, we could
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write the expected deviation evaluated at the beginning of the period of the
interest rate from its steady state value as
ECBt (bit) = biTRt = ¡ δy δp −1 ¢
⎛
⎝
ECBt (byt)
ECBt (bpt)
εTRt
⎞
⎠ . (41)
Using (37) to (39) we can write
ECBt (bit) = ¡ θiq θig θiη θiv θih ¢
Ã
ECBt (bξt)bht
!
=biTRt =
=
¡
δy δp
¢µ θyq θyg θyη θyv θyh
θpq θpg θpη θpv θph
¶Ã
ECBt (bξt)bht
!
−εTRt .
So, the value of bht to achieve the desired target rate has to be
bht = δyθyq + δpθpq − θiqθih − δyθyh − δpθphECBt (bqt) + δyθyg + δpθpg − θigθih − δyθyh − δpθphECBt (bgt)
+
δyθyη + δpθpη − θiη
θih − δyθyh − δpθph
ECBt (bηt) + δyθyv + δpθpv − θivθih − δyθyh − δpθphECBt (bvt)
− 1
θih − δyθyh − δpθph
εTRt . (42)
Substituting bht back into (37) to (39) we obtain the system as a function of the
fundamental shocks of the economy (bqt, bgt, bηt, bvt, and εTRt ) after including the
feedback rule.
To make rule (42) operational we have to specify the information set of the
central bank at the time of the open market operation. A natural assumption is
that the central bank has perfect knowledge about the monetary conditions of
the economy but has poor information about the current state of real variables.
Thus, we assume that only bηt and bvt are known by the central bank at the time
of the policy decision so that ECBt (bqt) = ECBt (bgt) = 0 but ECBt (bηt) = bηt and
ECBt (bvt) = bvt. Then (42) becomes
bht = δyθyη + δpθpη − θiηθih − δyθyh − δpθphbηt + δyθyv + δpθpv − θivθih − δyθyh − δpθph bvt
− 1
θih − δyθyh − δpθph
εTRt . (43)
Substituting in (37) to (39) yields the system
⎛
⎝
bytbptbit
⎞
⎠ =
⎛
⎝
θyq θyg λyη λyv θyTR
θpq θpg λpη λpv θpTR
θiq θig ξiη ξiv θiTR
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bqtbgtbηtbvt
εTRt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
= Θ
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bqtbgtbηtbvt
εTRt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
,
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where
λkj =
θkjθih − θkhθiλ
θih − δyθyh − δpθph
and
ξij = δyλyj + δpλpj
for k = y, p, i and j = q, g, η, v.
Let Γ be a diagonal matrix with the variances of the shocks
E
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bqtbgtbηtbvt
εTRt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
bqtbgtbηtbvt
εTRt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
0⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= Γ.
Then, we can compute the variance-covariance matrix of the endogenous vari-
ables implied by the model.
Σ = E
⎡
⎣
⎛
⎝
bytbptbit
⎞
⎠
⎛
⎝
bytbptbit
⎞
⎠
0⎤
⎦ = ΘΓΘ0 = ΦΦ0,
and write the system in terms of unit variance shocks (eqt , e
g
t , e
TR
t ) as
⎛
⎝
bytbptbit
⎞
⎠ = Φ
⎛
⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
beqtbegtbeηtbevtbeTRt
⎞
⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
.
For the simulations below, we will make the coeﬃcients of the Taylor rule
equal to
δy = δp = 0,
so there is no feedback from the state of the economy. In this case, the coeﬃ-
cients of the matrix Φ are:
Table 2
Impact coeﬃcients in the model (×100)
Shocks
Variable beqt begt beηt bevt beTRtbyt 0.1403 0.7156 0.0000 0.0000 0.0509bpt -0.1819 0.1095 0.0000 0.0020 0.1696bit -0.4429 0.2666 0.0000 0.0000 -0.4000
This table shows the impact coeﬃcients of unit variance shocks. The central
bank is assumed to know η and v at the time of the policy decision
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and the variance decomposition is:
Table 3
Variance decomposition in the model
Shocks
Variable beqt begt beηt bevt beTRtbyt 0.0368 0.9582 0.0000 0.0000 0.0048bpt 0.4480 0.1623 0.0000 0.0000 0.3895bit 0.4592 0.1663 0.0000 0.0000 0.3744
This table shows the variance decomposition of unit variance shocks. The central
bank is assumed to know η and v at the time of the policy decision
From this table we see the main shock aﬀecting output in the model is the gov-
ernment expenditure shock. The monetary shock is important in determining
the variability of interest rates and prices while the technology shock also aﬀects
prices and the interest rate. Furthermore, because η and v are included in the
information set of the central bank at the time of policy decisions, these shocks
do not aﬀect endogenous variables anymore and the model behaves as if only
three shocks drive total volatility. Thus, in the identification schemes below we
will be looking for a supply shock (beqt ), a real demand shock (begt ), and a nominal
demand shock (beTRt ). Also notice that long run restrictions are of no use for
identification purposes here.
3 Identification of shocks in the model
The coeﬃcients in the matrix Φ indicate the percentage deviation of y, p and i
induced by a change of one standard deviation in q, g, and eTR. An empirical
researcher would construct Σ from data on output, prices and interest rates. If
we assume that the model is the data generating process his estimated variance
covariance matrix of the variables of interest would converge asymptotically
to the true Σ. As we are only interested in a theoretical exercise let us just
assume that the econometrician can use the true Σ to recover the structural
shocks. Identification of structural shocks means using the estimated Σ to find
a particular Φ, such that ΦΦ0 = Σ by imposing enough restrictions on Φ to make
it unique.7 The exercise to be carried out here is to review several identification
schemes to see how close they are in identifying the true responses to shocks.
3.1 Zero-Restrictions
The Cholesky decomposition of Σ delivers a unique lower triangular matrix
ΦCHOL
ΦCHOL =
⎡
⎣
φp1 0 0
φy1 φy2 0
φi1 φi2 φi3
⎤
⎦ , (44)
7See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [3] as a general survey about identification schemes
applied in the literature.
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so, ⎛
⎝
bytbptbit
⎞
⎠ = ΦCHOL
⎛
⎝
u1t
u2t
umt
⎞
⎠ . (45)
In this expression uit, i = 1, 2,m represent the three structural shocks estimated
through this identification scheme. This procedure can be used if one accepts a
recursive structure meaning that only shock u1 aﬀects contemporaneously the
first variable, shocks u1 and u2 aﬀect the second variable, and so on. It is
usually assumed that shocks u1 and u2 are in the information set of the central
bank who can react contemporaneously to them in setting the interest rate. In
this sense, the shock um is interpreted as a monetary policy shock which does
not aﬀect prices and output within the same period.8 From the last row of this
system a feedback rule of the central bank relating bi, by, and bp can be derived asbit = ϑybyt + ϑpbpt + φimumt. (46)
To obtain this policy rule, use the first row of (45) to substitute for u1t
u1t =
byt
φy1
, (47)
in the second row to get the value of u2t
u2t =
1
φp2
bpt − φp1φp2φy1 byt. (48)
Then substitute both u1t and u2t in the third row
bit = φi1φp2 − φi2φp1φy1φp2 byt + φi2φp2 bpt + φimum. (49)
Hence
ϑy =
φi1φp2 − φi2φp1
φy1φp2
; ϑp =
φi2
φp2
. (50)
Table 4 shows the estimated impact coeﬃcients that results from applying
the Cholesky decomposition.
Table 4
Estimated impact coeﬃcients (×100): Cholesky decomposition
Shocks
Variable u1t u2t umtbyt 0.7310 0.0000 0.0000bpt 0.0841 0.2585 0.0000bit 0.1480 0.1140 0.6264
This table shows the impact coeﬃcients of unit variance shocks computed
from a Cholesky decomposition of the variance covariance matrix
8See Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [4] as a prominent example of that approach.
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This decomposition generates the estimated coeﬃcients for the rule:
ϑy = 0.15 and ϑp = 0.44.
Although the central bank in this economy does not follow a contemporaneous
feedback rule (i.e. the true coeﬃcients of the rule are δy = δp = 0), the imposi-
tion of the triangular structure in the decomposition identifies such a rule from
the contemporaneous endogenous correlation between output, prices and the
interest rate. Notice the estimated rule responds more aggressively to inflation
than to output as is usually demanded to provide stability in monetary models
with Taylor rules. Also notice the estimated impact coeﬃcients of the monetary
shock diﬀer from the true ones.
In fact, the misspecification of the Taylor rule is a general phenomenon.
Table 5 shows the pairs of estimated coeﬃcients (ϑy;ϑp) for diﬀerent values of
the feedback parameters δy and δp.
Table 5
Estimated coeﬃcients in Taylor rule
δp
δy 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5
0.00 (0.15;0.44) (0.12;0.87) (0.09;1.20) (0.08;1.43)
0.25 (0.14;0.51) (0.11;0.93) (0.09;1.24) (0.07;1.46)
0.50 (0.14;0.58) (0.11;0.98) (0.08;1.27) (0.07;1.49)
0.75 (0.13;0.65) (0.10;1.03) (0.08;1.31) (0.07;1.52)
1.00 (0.13;0.72) (0.10;1.08) (0.08;1.35) (0.06;1.55)
This table shows the estimated coeﬃcients (ϑy ;ϑp) of the Taylor rule for
diﬀerent values of the feedback parameters δy and δp.
We observe this scheme underestimates the coeﬃcient on output and overes-
timates the coeﬃcient on inflation. Also, notice the estimated rule assumes
the central bank responds contemporaneously to output and prices while in the
model it only responds to some fundamental shocks aﬀecting these variables.
Finally, we can compute the variance decomposition associated with this
identification scheme:
Table 6
Estimated variance decomposition: Cholesky decomposition
Shocks
Variable u1t u2t umtbyt 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000bpt 0.0957 0.9042 0.0000bit 0.0512 0.0304 0.9182
This table shows estimated variance decomposition of unit variance shocks
computed from a Cholesky decomposition of the variance covariance matrix.
Because shocks u1 and u2 cannot be associated with fundamental disturbances
we cannot comment on them. However, we observe how this identification
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scheme completely misses the importance of the monetary shock, the only one
the scheme is designed to identify, in generating volatility. By construction it
underestimates its contribution for output and prices. It also overestimates its
contribution to interest rate variability.
3.2 Sign Restrictions
Another possibility is to estimate the matrix Φ directly using sign restrictions
implied by theoretical arguments. Instead of imposing zero-restrictions on Φ,
one can use the following approach proposed by Canova and de Nicoló [1].
In this approach orthogonalization and identification are separated from each
other. First, an eigenvector decomposition orthogonalizes the shocks. Then the
matrix of eigenvectors V multiplied by the diagonal matrix of square roots of
the eigenvalues D1/2 is taken as a candidate Φ. Finally, V D1/2 is multiplied by
diﬀerent rotation matrices
Qm,n(ω) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 0 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
0 1 · · · 0 0 · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 0 · · · cos(ω) · · · − sin(ω) · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
0 0 · · · sin(ω) · · · cos(ω) · · · 0
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · 0
0 0 · · · 0 · · · 0 · · · 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
(51)
where the subscript (m,n) indicates that only row m and column n are ro-
tated by the angle ω ∈ [0, π]. Each resulting Φm,n(ω) = V D1/2Qm,n(ω) with
economically sensible impact coeﬃcients is selected as candidate identification
scheme.
It turns out the model proposed here delivers such signs for the eﬀect on
the variables of interest of an array of shocks. In particular, we could write the
system as ⎛
⎝
bytbptbit
⎞
⎠ =
⎡
⎣
φys φyd φym
φps φpd φpm
φis φid φim
⎤
⎦
⎛
⎝
ust
udt
umt
⎞
⎠ ,
In this identification, us is interpreted as a supply shock. This means it should
aﬀect positively output, and negatively prices and interest rates (as eqt did in
the model). Second, ud can be interpreted as a demand shock so that it aﬀects
positively output, prices and interest rates (as egt in the model). Finally, um
should be a monetary shock impacting output and prices positively while interest
rates negatively (as eTRt did). These theoretically implied signs will be used
below to construct series for orthogonalized shocks with an economic content.
When we use this method, we divide the interval [0, π] in 500 points. Since
there are 3 possible rotations in the 3×3 matrix Σ, this means 1500 possible
combinations.
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Of all possible rotations, 460 gave the right signs. Thus, Table 7 presents the
average of them while Table 8 shows the standard deviation of the estimations
as a measure of how reliable this method is in capturing the right coeﬃcients.
Table 7
Estimated impact coeﬃcients (×100): Sign restrictions
Shocks
Variable ust udt umtbyt 0.2203 0.6576 0.1920bpt -0.1686 0.1071 0.1544bit -0.3095 0.4098 -0.3484
This table shows the impact coeﬃcients of unit variance shocks computed
from the variance covariance matrix using a sign restriction scheme.
Table 8
Std. deviation of estimated impact coeﬃcients: Sign restrictions
Shocks
Variable ust udt umtbyt 0.0850 0.0000 0.0967bpt 0.0683 0.0000 0.0741bit 0.1530 0.0000 0.1370
This table shows the standard deviation of the impact coeﬃcients of unit
variance shocks computed from the variance covariance matrix using a
sign restriction scheme.
Table 9 shows the average variance decomposition across the identifications
that satisfy the sign restrictions. Table 10 summarizes the variability in these
identifications
Table 9
Estimated variance decomposition: Sign restrictions
Shocks
Variable ust udt umtbyt 0.1043 0.8091 0.0864bpt 0.4477 0.1552 0.3970bit 0.2788 0.3930 0.3280
This table shows the estimated variance decomposition of unit variance shocks
computed from the variance covariance matrix using a sign restriction scheme.
17
Table 10
Std. deviation of estimated variance decomposition: Sign restrictions
Shocks
Variable ust udt umtbyt 0.0640 0.0000 0.0640bpt 0.2849 0.0000 0.2849bit 0.2041 0.0000 0.2041
This table shows the standard deviation of the estimated variance decomposition
of unit variance shocks computed from the variance covariance matrix using a
sign restriction scheme.
If we compare the numbers in Tables 7 and 9 with those in Tables 2 and 3 we see
this identification method is able to approximate both the impact coeﬃcients
and the variance decomposition very well on average. However, Tables 8 and
10 warn that may be instances of large deviations with respect to the true
coeﬃcients.
4 Identification of Shocks in the Data
In this section we apply the identification schemes outlined above to the data.
For that, we estimate a VAR(4) on the log of real GDP (yt), the log of the
consumer price index CPI (pt), and the 3-month Treasury Bill rate (it). The
details about these series can be found in Appendix A. We use the 3-month
T-Bill rate instead of the usual Federal funds rate for several reasons. First, we
want to use an interest rate that closely aﬀects the economic activity, which is
the implied assumption in our model. For that, a three month rate is a better
choice than a daily rate. In this sense, we are also including the transmission of
shocks through the yield curve usually not considered in the empirical literature.
Second, the contemporaneous correlations that we want to analyze in this paper
should be stronger in a longer maturity rate not so closely controlled by the
central bank.
After estimating the VAR, the strategy is to decompose the variance covari-
ance matrix of disturbances. The next sections apply the identification schemes
reviewed in the previous section.
4.1 Cholesky Decomposition
First, we use a Cholesky decomposition. The resulting matrix of coeﬃcients
and the variance decomposition are included in the next two tables.
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Table 11
Estimated coeﬃcients (Data)
Cholesky identification scheme
Shocks
u1t u2t umtbyt 0.7195 0.0000 0.0000bpt 0.0241 0.3226 0.0000bit 0.1612 0.1605 0.6086
Table 12
Variance decomposition (Data)
Choleski identification scheme
Shocks
Variance of ust udt umtbyt 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000bpt 0.0055 0.9945 0.0000bit 0.0616 0.0610 0.8774
Using (50) we find the coeﬃcients of the feedback rule to be ϑy = 0.21 and
ϑp = 0.50. We see that both coeﬃcients are positive so that the central bank
reacts to increases in output or inflation above trend by raising the interest rate.
We can work out the conditions on the matrix Σ which ensure this result. From
Σ ≡
⎡
⎣
σyy σyp σyr
σpy σpp σpr
σry σrp σrr
⎤
⎦ =
⎡
⎣
φp1 0 0
φy1 φy2 0
φr1 φr2 φr3
⎤
⎦
⎡
⎣
φp1 φy1 φr1
0 φy2 φr2
0 0 φr3
⎤
⎦
and after some tedious algebra it is easy to see that the coeﬃcients in expression
(50) implies
sign (ϑy) = sign
"
σyrσpp − σypσpr
σpp − (σyp)2 /σyy
#
, (52)
while
sign (ϑp) = sign [σprσyy − σypσyr] . (53)
Given that σpp and σyy are both positive, a suﬃcient condition for both ϑy
and ϑp to be positive is to have the covariance between output and prices (σyp)
small together with the covariance between prices and the interest rate (σpr) and
output and the interest rate (σyr) both positive. Notice this result is completely
independent on the existence of a Taylor rule. As long as the data shows these
covariances, which is the case here, a triangular scheme will always estimate
an interest rate equation with the form of such a rule. Also notice that, as
the theoretical exercise has shown in the previous section, this estimation may
misinterpret the comovement between output, prices and the interest rate as
evidence for the existence of a monetary policy rule while this comovement may
be driven by the joint responses of these variables to all fundamental shocks.
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4.2 Sign-Shape Restrictions
We use the sign restrictions approach to identify structural shocks from the data.
Again, we use 500 diﬀerent angles for each of the 3 rotation matrices. As in the
theoretical part, many of the rotations lead to valid impact coeﬃcients. We find
872 rotations that produce the correct signs of the impact responses. In order
to narrow down the number of identified shocks we can use restrictions on the
shape of the implied impulse responses. We use the condition that reasonable
impulse responses should not change sign in the first periods. Applying this
condition we find 20 rotations consistent with the criterion of no sign-switch
implying mean responses and standard deviations as shown in Tables 13 and
14.
Table 13
Average estimated coeﬃcients (Data)
Sign and shape restrictions identification scheme
Shocks
ust udt umtbyt 0.1539 0.6348 0.3016bpt -0.3088 0.0714 0.0646bit -0.1728 0.4375 -0.4481
Table 14
Standard deviations of estimated coeﬃcients (Data)
Sign and shape restrictions identification scheme
Shocks
ust udt umtbyt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000bpt 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000bit 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
The sign and shape restrictions approach is able to estimate very precisely the
impact coeﬃcients from the data. This high precision is also reflected in the
low standard deviations of the variance decomposition:
Table 15
Average variance decomposition (Data)
Sign and shape restrictions scheme
Shocks
Variance of ust udt umtbyt 0.0458 0.7785 0.1757bpt 0.9111 0.0487 0.0402bit 0.0709 0.4534 0.4757
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Table 16
Standard deviation of variance decomposition (Data)
Sign and shape restrictions scheme
Shocks
Variance of ust udt umtbyt 0.0287 0.0000 0.0287bpt 0.0598 0.0000 0.0598bit 0.0584 0.0000 0.0584
4.3 Estimated Impulse Response Functions and Monetary
Shocks
More informative about the comparison between the two estimations is to look
at the impulse response functions as well as the series for the monetary shocks
that they imply. Figure 1 presents the responses of output, prices and the inter-
est rate derived from a one standard deviation change in the monetary shock.
For comparison with previous studies we also include the responses computed as
in Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans [4], denoted as CEE in the figure. They
used a Cholesky decomposition of a 6 variable VAR(4) ordered as real GDP,
price deflator, commodity prices, Federal funds rate, nonborrowed reserves and
total reserves. From the graph we observe that the sign restriction estimation
provides reasonable magnitudes as compared with the two triangular schemes.
However, it does not present the price puzzle behavior typical of Cholesky de-
compositions. Notice the sign restriction estimation predicts a sizable contem-
poraneous response of output to a monetary shock at the same time that prices
respond sluggishly.
We can compare the series for shocks estimated through the three methods.
These series are reported in Figure 2. The correlation between the monetary
shock estimated through the Cholesky decomposition of the 3-variable VAR and
the one estimated using sign restrictions is 0.84. The correlation of the shocks
estimated with the two triangular schemes is 0.71 while the correlation between
the CEE shocks and the ones computed with the sign restriction is 0.65.
Next, we provide evidence that links the monetary policy shock to one of its
possible sources, the central bank. For that, we regress the Federal Reserve hold-
ings of government assets (FEDSEC) as well as nonborrowed reserves (NBR)
on the shocks just estimated together with four lags of the dependent variable.
Table 17 shows the results of the OLS regressions in the columns labelled "Sign
restriction".
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Table 17
Regression of policy variables on shocks
Dependent variable, k(t)
Sign restriction Cholesky CEE
FEDSEC NBR FEDSEC NBR FEDSEC NBR
constant 0.1167 -0.1289 0.0899 -0.1493 0.0601 -0.2515
(0.846) (-0.477) (0.663) (-0.547) (0.439) (-0.974)
k(t− 1) 0.8083 1.2745 0.8321 1.2808 0.8281 1.2939
(8.212) (6.352) (8.665) (6.367) (8.674) (6.209)
k(t− 2) 0.2151 -0.5096 0.1909 -0.5189 0.1953 -0.5391
(1.777) (-1.981) (1.624) (-1.987) (1.702) (-1.992)
k(t− 3) -0.1051 0.3408 -0.1009 0.3531 -0.0906 0.3577
(-1.007) (2.186) (-0.966) (2.220) (-0.873) (2.137)
k(t− 4) -0.0300 -0.1220 -0.0220 -0.1325 -0.0423 -0.1300
(-0.432) (-1.540) (-0.322) (-1.677) (-0.604) (-1.570)
Demand -0.0247 -0.6243
(-0.127) (-2.357)
Supply 0.1705 0.2384
(1.161) (0.877)
Monetary 0.5571 0.8985 0.4220 1.4181 0.2338 1.2799
(2.525) (2.498) (1.595) (3.057) (1.101) (3.726)
Results from OLS regression of variable k(t) on four lags and the fundamental shocks.
T-statistics based on White’s heteroskedasticity consistent variance matrix in paren-
thesis.
A monetary shock that lowers interest rates generates a statistically significant
increase in both, the Federal Reserve holdings of government securities as well
as nonborrowed reserves (both coeﬃcients with p-values of 0.01). This finding
supports the idea of the Fed reducing interest rates by buying securities in the
open market. Furthermore, the monetary shock is the only one influencing the
government assets in the hands of the Fed. On the other hand, nonborrowed
reserves are also aﬀected by the demand shock. A demand shock that raises
output, interest rates and prices, also reduces nonborrowed reserves. From
equation (14), we see that an increase in expenditures has a negative impact on
reserves through the withdrawing of cash. Supply shocks do not aﬀect either of
the policy variables.
The table also shows the estimations using the monetary shocks identified by
the Cholesky decomposition and the CEE scheme. In these cases, the monetary
shocks do not significantly aﬀect the Federal Reserve holdings of government
securities and only have an impact on nonborrowed reserves. Thus, it is hard
to justify these shocks measure innovations originating from the central bank.
One advantage of the sign restriction approach is that it allows us to estimate
the response of the variables of interest to other shocks. Figure 3 shows the
responses of output, prices and interest rates to the three shocks considered:
a supply shock, a demand shock, and the monetary shock. A positive supply
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shock persistently raises output while reducing prices and the interest rate. A
positive demand shock increases output, prices and the interest rate. A positive
monetary shock that raises the interest rate, lowers output and prices.
Finally, we can plot the estimated series for the three orthogonal shocks
estimated through the sign restrictions imposed by the model: the supply shock,
the demand shock, and the monetary shock. This is done in Figure 4. Notice
the supply shock is relatively small as compared to the demand and monetary
shocks.
5 Discussion
The motivation of this paper has been the apparent separation between theoret-
ical and applied work in the analysis of the monetary transmission mechanism.
This separation is manifested most clearly along four dimensions: (i) the dif-
ferent set of variables assumed to be controlled by central banks in theoretical
models and the ones they can directly influence in reality, (ii) the diﬀerent set of
variables used to analyze the monetary transmission mechanism in theoretical
models as compared to the set used in empirical work, (iii) the lack of a sensible
explanation as of what monetary policy shocks mean, and (iv) the need of a set
of identifying restrictions fully generated by theory.
We believe the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model constructed in
this paper may be useful in responding to these challenges. The strategy has
been to make a step forward towards incorporating the way monetary policy is
implemented in an otherwise conventional model. The consequences of this step
are staggering. On the one hand, the model helps us along the four dimensions
mentioned in the previous paragraph. In the model, the central bank sets targets
on a market interest rate and exerts its control by managing the supply of
reserves in the economy. Thus, the model makes the connection between narrow
definitions of money and broad ones, a distinction often emphasized in the
empirical literature. Another distinction this literature stresses is between short
term rates, close to central bank control but far from aﬀecting economic activity
directly, and long term rates farther from control by the monetary authority but
directly influencing economic activity. Although the model does not have a term
structure we believe it can be helpful in this dimension because it emphasizes the
distinction between operating targets and market-determined rates and provides
explanations as of why they may not be equal.
In fact, the diﬀerence between the value for the interest rate the central
bank should have targeted and the value determined by the market is the crux
of the matter for this paper because it is this diﬀerence what is typically used to
measure monetary policy shocks. We argue that this diﬀerence is a consequence
of the contemporaneous concurrence of a variety of shocks. Furthermore, we
use the model to identify which part is attributable to changes in the monetary
environment of the economy and, in this way, provide a rationale as of why
these shocks occur and what they mean.
One consequence of the contemporaneous correlation between endogenous
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variables is that it may lead to a misidentification of the fundamental shocks
hitting the economy. In particular, we provide an example where the endogenous
reaction of output, prices and interest rates to fundamental shocks can induce
cross-correlations which might be erroneously misinterpreted as a Taylor rule.
This erroneous interpretation of the cross-correlations would treat the error
term of the supposed Taylor rule as a monetary ‘policy’ shock while in the
example it is just a combination of fundamental shocks. Furthermore, we show
that stochastic deviations from a Taylor rule by the central bank may not be
the only source of monetary shocks. In fact, we demonstrate how a variety
of variables produce the same type of responses we associate with monetary
disturbances so that an econometrician provided with data generated from the
model would not be able to distinguish between them. These other variables
are variations in autonomous factors, or random changes in the cash-to-deposit
ratio. One implication of this finding is that instead of estimating Taylor rules
to identify monetary shocks, one alternative strategy could be concentrating on
the qualitative responses of endogenous variables to these types of shocks. Of
course, in order to implement this strategy one needs to compare the responses
of the economy to monetary shocks with the responses to other fundamental
shocks, a point commonly forgotten in the theoretical literature. This is why
we have included shocks stemming from the demand and supply of goods.
Finally, the incorporation of the implementation of monetary policy makes
money nonneutral without the need to impose additional frictions as limited
participation in the asset market or sticky prices. The only features needed
is a reason to hold money in general equilibrium (here provided by the cash-
in-advance constraint in consumption goods purchases), the need of firms to
finance their wage bill before getting sales receipts, and a reserve requirement.
Further research can be built on the model presented here. One simplifying
assumptions that need to be changed is the absence of a state variable such
as capital. This is important because in an economy with capital as a state
variable the interest rate target will be varying over time. However, we believe
the same type of results will still hold. In any case, optimal policy issues could
be readdressed with a more general model. Is there an optimal way to set the
target? Does this policy mimic a Taylor rule for the target? The rich structure
of the model also allows to address questions like: Given that the operational
targets are volatile at the time of policy decisions, does this fact have any
implications about the design of a rule in order to achieve an optimal policy?
Do institutional aspects like the level of reserve requirements, the volatility of
float and treasury deposits, the customs of using cash versus checks, etc. matter
for how well the central bank can target the interest rate and therefore for the
conduct of monetary policy? In summary, we think that the model presented
here opens up a path to readdress many questions in monetary policy analysis
and to ask many new ones.
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A Data
The data for the calibration is taken from the FRED database of the Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. We use the following series (acronyms in paren-
thesis): Output (yt) is the "Real Gross Domestic Product" (GDPC1), the price
level (Pt) is the "CPI price index" (CPIAUCSL), the interest rate (it) is the
"3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate" (TB3MS) and government
expenditures (gt) are "Real Government Consumption Expenditures and Gross
Investment" (GCEC1). Output and government expenditures are divided by
"Civilian Noninstitutional Population" (CNP16OV) to make variables in per
capita terms and logged. Employment (nt) is computed as "Civilian Employ-
ment: Sixteen Years and Over" (CE16OV) divided by population. We estimate
a VAR(4) of yt, Pt, and it in levels and store the variance-covariance matrix of
the residuals.
We also use the Flow of Funds data of the Board of Governors of the Fed-
eral Reserve System to compute series for the financial variables. Cash (Xt)
is measured as "Currency Outside Banks" (FL713125005.Q). Deposits (Dt) is
the sum of "Checkable Deposits in Commercial Banks" (FL763129205.Q) plus
"Small Time and Savings Deposits in Commercial Banks" (FL763131005.Q) plus
"Large Time deposits in Commercial Banks" (FL763135005.Q) plus "Check-
able Deposits in Savings Banks" (FL443127005.Q) plus "Small Time and Sav-
ings Deposits in Savings Banks" (FL443131005.Q) plus "Large Time deposits
25
in Savings Banks" (FL443135005.Q). Reserves (Rt) is computed as "Depos-
itory Institutions Reserves" (FL713113000.Q) plus "Vault Cash of Commer-
cial Banks" (FL723025000.Q). Autonomous factors (Vt) are equal to "Fed-
eral Government deposits at the Monetary Authority" (FL713123105.Q) minus
"Federal Reserve Float" (FL713022003.Q). Government bonds (Bt) is equal
to "Total Treasury Securities" (FL893061505.Q) minus "Treasury Securities in
State and Local Governments" (FL213061105.Q) "Treasury Securities in Foreign
Hands" (FL263061105.Q) minus "Treasury Securities in Monetary Authority"
(FL713061100.Q). To construct the series we start with the initial value of the
stocks (table ltab) and add the seasonally adjusted increments (table atab).
For the identification of monetary policy shock with the CEE scheme, we
use data on the "Eﬀective Federal Funds Rate" (FEDFUNDS), "Nonborrowed
reserves" (BOGNONBR), "Total Reserves" (TRARR), and a commodity price
index.
The sample covers the period from the first quarter of 1960 until the first
quarter of 2003. This is the period with observations for all variables. When
only monthly data is available, the numbers are averaged to obtain quarterly
series. For all empirical applications, the data was detrended using a linear
trend.
B Calibration
Some parameters are taken directly from the data. This is the case of the
reserve requirement (ρ) computed as the average reserves over deposits. Also,
we use the sample averages of the government expenditure over output (gt/yt),
the cash-to-deposit ratio (Xt/Dt), the fraction of the monetary base over total
government liabilities (Ht/At), and the fraction of autonomous factors over total
government liabilities (Vt/At) to approximate the equivalent ratios at the steady
state, gss/yss, ηss, hss, and vss, respectively.
The average technology shock (qss) is arbitrarily fixed at 1. The time dis-
count (β) is set so that the steady state value of the interest rate matches the
average interest rate (it) over the sample. The disutility of labor (Ψ) is com-
puted so that labor at the steady state matches the average of employment (nt)
and the capital elasticity of output (α) is determined as the fraction of income
remunerating labor equal to 0.33. Finally, the rest of parameters (γ, ψ, αg, σq,
σg, ση, σv, and σTR) are set to approximate the variance-covariance matrix of
the model to that of the residuals found in the data. This matrix is
Σ =
⎡
⎣
0.5177 0.0173 0.1160
0.0173 0.1047 0.0557
0.1160 0.0557 0.4222
⎤
⎦ .
The next two tables show the values assigned to the parameters of the model.
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Table A.1
Values for parameters in preferences, technology and reserve requirement
Symbol Value Meaning
β 0.99 Discount factor
γ 3.40 Inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption
ψ 1.90 Inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply
Ψ 13.3 Disutility of labor
α 0.33 Capital elasticity of output
αg 0.15 Government expenditure elasticity of output
ρ 0.03 Reserve requirement
Table A.2
Values for distribution of shocks and monetary policy
Symbol Value Meaning
qss 1.0000 Average technology shock
σq 0.0015 Std. deviation of technology shock
gss 0.1171 Average government shock
σg 0.0350 Std. deviation of government shock
ηss 0.0855 Average cash demand shock
ση 0.0001 Std. deviation of cash demand shock
vss 0.0015 Average autonomous factor shock
σv 0.0130 Std. deviation of autonomous factor shock
hss 0.2541 Average oﬃcial reserves
δy 0.0000 Output coeﬃcient in Taylor rule
δp 0.0000 Inflation coeﬃcient in Taylor rule
σTR 0.0040 Std. deviation of monetary policy shock
C Log-linearization
The first order conditions of the system are
1
ptc
γ
t
= β(1 + it)Et
∙µ
1 + vt+1
1 + vt
¶
1
pt+1c
γ
t+1
¸
, (54)
(1− α)qtgαgt = (1 + it)Ψn
α+ψ
t c
γ
t , (55)
yt = qtg
αg
t n
1−α
t , (56)
market clearing in the goods market,
ct + gt = yt, (57)
and market clearing in the reserve market,
ht = vt +
µ
ρ+ ηt
1 + ηt
¶
ptct. (58)
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C.1 Steady state
At the steady state, all real and normalized nominal variables are constant.
Denote such levels by the subindex ss. The system (54) to (58) becomes
iss =
1
β
− 1,
(1 + iss)Ψcγssn
α+ψ
ss = (1− α)qssgαgss ,
yss = qssg
αg
ss n
1−α
ss ,
css = yss − gss,
and
hss = vss +
µ
ρ+ ηss
1 + ηss
¶
psscss.
C.2 Linearization
In the linearization, hat variables correspond to percentage deviations with re-
spect to the steady state. The exception is the interest rate which is measured
as the diﬀerence with respect to the value at the steady state. The linearized
system of equations is as follows:
bpt + 1
1 + iss
bit + γbct = vss
1 + vss
bvt +Et ∙bpt+1 + γbct+1 − vss
1 + vss
bvt+1¸ ,
1
1 + iss
bit + (ψ + α)bnt + γbct = bqt + αgbgt,
byt − (1− α)bnt = bqt + αgbgt,
yssbyt − cssbct = gssbgt,
and
bpt + bct = (ρ− 1)ηss
(ρ+ ηss)(1 + ηss)
bηt − vss(hss − vss)bvt + hss(hss − vss)bht.
This provides a system of five unknown linear functions (byt, bpt, bit, bnt, bct) of the
shocks (bqt, bgt, bηt, bvt) and the policy variable (bht).
For the case of i.i.d. shocks the system becomes
bpt + 1
1 + iss
bit + γbct = vss
1 + vss
bvt (59)
1
1 + iss
bit + (ψ + α)bnt + γbct = bqt + αgbgt, (60)
byt − (1− α)bnt = bqt + αgbgt, (61)
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yssbyt − cssbct = gssbgt, (62)
and
bpt + bct = (ρ− 1)ηss
(ρ+ ηss)(1 + ηss)
bηt − vss(hss − vss)bvt + hss(hss − vss)bht. (63)
or
Φ
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bytbptbitbntbct
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= Ω
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bqtbgtbΨtbηtbvtbht
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
with
Φ =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
0 0
1
1 + iss
ψ + α γ
yss 0 0 0 −css
1 0 0 −(1− α) 0
0 1 0 0 1
0 1
1
1 + iss
0 γ
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
and
Ω =
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1 αg −1 0 0 0
0 gss 0 0 0 0
1 αg 0 0 0 0
0 0 0
(ρ− 1)ηss
(ρ+ ηss)(1 + ηss)
− vss
(hss − vss)
hss
(hss − vss)
0 0 0 0
vss
(hss − vss)
0
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
.
Then, the solution is
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bytbptbitbntbct
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= Φ−1Ω
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bqtbgtbηtbvtbht
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
= Θ
⎡
⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
bqtbgtbηtbvtbht
⎤
⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
or byt = θyqbqt + θygbgt + θyηbηt + θyvbvt + θyhbht,bpt = θpqbqt + θpgbgt + θpηbηt + θpvbvt + θphbht,bit = θiqbqt + θigbgt + θiηbηt + θivbvt + θihbht.bnt = θnqbqt + θngbgt + θnηbηt + θnvbvt + θnhbht,bct = θcqbqt + θcgbgt + θcηbηt + θcvbvt + θchbht.
The first three rows form the system (37) to (39).
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FIGURE 1: Impulse responses to a monetary policy shock
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FIGURE 2: Monetary policy shocks identified with differnet schemes
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FIGURE 3: Impulse responses to three shocks estimated with sign-shape identification scheme
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FIGURE 4: Fundamental shocks identified with the sign restriction scheme
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